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A U T H O R

Vinay Srinivasan

I

am currently a freshman biology major. Although I
am majoring in the sciences, I have an avid interest
in world politics and am a member of the Honors
Program. Throughout this process, Professor Harry Mason
has provided invaluable guidance to me. His expertise in
this field was irreplaceable. This paper was presented at
the Showcase of Scholars this April in an oral presentation. I also serve as a writer for the Triple Helix, a national
undergraduate journal, which publishes articles related to all disciplines of
science, a CATS tutor, and an officer in Tri-Beta and SPUR.

A Political Quagmire

Abstract
This paper is intended to characterize the precarious
situation the House of Saud is facing. By exploring
previous historical and current events, this analysis
provides an insight into the complex web the House
of Saud has woven; analysis of these events allows a
glimpse into the future for this political regime and
the uncertainty it faces. This paper is not intended
to offer a solution or support a particular course of
action, group, or individual.
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Vinay provides the historical background and a current assessment of the
obstacles faced by the House of Saud in this paper. He has done excellent
research and his work is factual and of current interest in light of the key
role of oil resources and success of the War on Terror. The roles of religion,
politics, and commerce are explained in a succinct manner and the paper
demonstrates the tricky balance of political arrangements of the United
States in the Middle East.

The House of Saud currently finds itself at the heart
of controversy. It is being pressured by the United
States to be a key partner in the war on terror and
to improve the quality of life for the average Saudi,
while having to maintain its role as the guardian of
the holiest sites of Islam, Mecca and Medina. On
the other hand, numerous liberalizing forces believe
that the country lags behind many Western nations
and needs to increase the pace of modernization.
The royal family is believed to be corrupt, and this
does not please the general public. The House of
Saud is walking a political tightrope by trying to
placate those with whom it interacts, while trying
to cement its role in the current political system. All
these factors have resulted in an unstable political
regime that has to constantly satisfy the wishes of
others just to ensure that it remains in power.
In order to study the issue more closely, it is
necessary to review the structure of the ruling family
of Saudi Arabia and its relation to Wahhabiism,
the Islamic reform movement that follows the
teachings of Muhammad Ibn Abd Al-Wahhab. In
the mid 1700s, Muhammad Ibn Abd Al-Wahhab
and Muhammad Ibn Saud agreed that any territory

controlled by Ibn Saud or his heirs would adhere
to the strict Islamic teachings of Al-Wahhab.
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(Gold, 3) Both benefited from this
agreement because Saud would
have a religious reason to conquer
other parts of the kingdom, and the
teachings of Al-Wahhab could be
spread to others.
Although Saud’s territory at
that time was relatively small,
Saud’s heirs conquered much of the
surrounding area and established the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The holy
cities of Mecca and Medina had been
under the control of the Hashemites
for many centuries. However, by
1924, King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud
had established his base at Riyadh
and amassed a vast army. Saud
finally consolidated the kingdom by
expelling the Sharif of Mecca, Ali bin
Hussein, in 1925, thereby taking over
tutelage of the holy cities. Since then,
the House of Saud has adhered to
the agreement and has implemented
Al-Wahhab’s teachings. However,
the House of Saud soon discovered
that a monarch alone cannot claim
religious legitimacy, but needs the
help of clerics.
The House of Saud asks clerics,
usually ones who have studied the
Qur’an for years and are considered
experts, to give approval to its
decisions, so that the regime appears
legitimate to the people of Saudi
Arabia. (Gold, 79) However, clerics
did not always have the power that
they currently have. In 1979, the
Al-Masjid al-Haram in Mecca, the
holiest site of Islam, was seized by
dissidents. The dissidents claimed
that the royal family was not
legitimate due to its policy of rapid
Westernization after the discovery of
oil in Saudi Arabia. The royal family
was in a state of panic, because they
did not know what course of action
to pursue. They could not send
troops inside the city, because the
Qur’an strictly prohibits violence in
Mecca. (Qur’an, Al-Baqara [191])
The royal family had to first consult
with clerics and gain permission
from them to enter the mosque and
drive out the dissidents.
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One of the main tasks of
the Saudi monarch is to ensure that
pilgrims have safe and easy access to
the holy sites. The general populace
was furious that innocent pilgrims
were taken hostage inside the most
sacred of all Islamic sites. After Saudi
forces retook control of the mosque,
the royal family tried to restore order,
but some damage was already done.
An unexpected effect of the takeover
was that clerics ended up gaining
an enormous amount of influence
after realizing how much the Saudi
government depended on them.
(Kechichian, 61-62) Since then,
clerics have wielded much power
and advise the royal family on a
regular basis.
During the Gulf War (1990-91),
Saudi Arabia was a potential target
of invasion by Iraq. Iraq had massed
a huge army capable of conquering
more than Kuwait. (Gold, 158) Saudi
Arabia decided that it needed to
defend itself and began to search
for options, because its own army
was not large enough. One option
was the US military that could come
into Saudi Arabia to lead the fight
against Saddam Hussein. The other
option was using Osama Bin Laden.
(Unger, 143) Bin Laden suggested
that the House of Saud allow him
to use his mujahideen warriors so
that non-Muslims would not be
defending the holiest sites of Islam.
He also promised to have more than
100,000 mujahideen warriors and
to personally lead the fight himself.
However, the Saudi government
refused his offer and instead decided
to let American troops defend the
country. (Unger, 143) To many
Muslim people across the world, this
was an outrage. They perceived that
the royal family gave up its religious
legitimacy in exchange for support
against Saddam Hussein; this created
a rift within the population of Saudi
Arabia. The royal family asked
Sheik bin Baaz, the grand mufti
of Saudi Arabia at that time, to
issue a fatwa that gave American

troops permission to be stationed
on Saudi soil during the Gulf War.
(Lippman, 303) Although Sheik Bin
Baz reluctantly issued the fatwa,
many commoners and clerics were
still furious with the royal family’s
decision. Many clerics started to
issue their own decrees that claimed
the royal family was not fulfilling its
role as the guardian of the holiest
sites of Islam.
The presence of American
troops on Saudi soil brought great
concern to the Saudi populace and
eroded support for the royal family.
The United States had done things
such as open up its own radio
stations in Saudi Arabia; these
stations broadcast programs that
could be heard by the local citizens.
(Gold, 160) Many Saudis feared that
un-Islamic ideas could now easily
be spread across the Kingdom.
In 1990, a group of Saudi women
drove their own cars, which violated
Saudi laws and raised concern that
there was no longer respect for the
traditional Islamic values on which
the country was founded. (Gold,
160) Many scholars and clerics in
the country signed a petition that
requested King Fahd to repeal Saudi
laws that conflicted with Islam,
but the King rejected the petition.
(Gold, 160) Meanwhile, there were
many international organizations
that started to think that Saudi
Arabia should become even more
westernized and take a greater role
in protecting human rights. Two
distinct groups were created during
this time period. One group favored
the adoption of a Western legal code,
while the other favored a return to
the strict principles of Al-Wahhab.
Many new clerics began to
rise to prominence during this
time. Although these clerics may
not have been among the officially
sanctioned state clerics, they were
able to communicate effectively with
the common Saudis; the traditional
royal-family-approved clerics had
never communicated effectively
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with the general populace. The new
clerics were beginning to convince
the population that the House of
Saud was not working for Saudi
Arabia, an accusation that had
worried the royal family for a long
time. They claimed that the House of
Saud was serving the interests of the
West, especially the United States.
The clerics based this contention on
one basic principle that the entire
country could understand: unfair
distribution of wealth.
Saudi Arabia draws much of
its revenue from its vast reserves of
oil and natural gas. In 2004 alone,
the oil industry provided more than
$100 billion in revenue to Saudi
Arabia. (International Monetary
Fund [IMF]) However, ordinary
Saudi citizens receive little of the
income that the country gets from
oil sales. American companies such
as Texas Oil Company, Standard
Oil of California, and Standard Oil
of New Jersey helped to create the
first oil facilities in Saudi Arabia.
The Saudi government only acquired
full control over its oil facilities
in 1980 and in 1998 renamed the
company Saudi Aramco. Saudi
Aramco manages virtually all of
Saudi Arabia’s oil reserves, but
is under the direct control of the
royal family. The royal family still
frequently outsources many of the
contracts to American and Western
companies such as Schlumburger,
WesternGeco, Halliburton, and
Weatherford, that provide a majority
of the workforce in the oil industry
as well most of the logistics for the
daily operations. (Bradley, 208) For
this reason, much of the money from
oil revenues does not stay within
Saudi Arabia and does not reach all
classes of society.
The general public and many
clerics petitioned the royal family to
initiate a policy of “Saudiization”
of these enterprises, because many
Saudi companies are now acquiring
the expertise needed to carry out
these operations. The royal family,

however, automatically gets its
share of the oil money, because
the state owns Saudi Aramco
directly. The princes have been
reluctant to implement a policy
of “Saudiization,” because they
have had long relationships with
American companies and they
additionally fear that oil production
may slow during a transition phase
of “Saudiization.”
Inflation in Saudi Arabia was
increasing by only about 0.4% in
2004, but is now increasing by about
2.8% in 2007. (IMF) Gross Domestic
Product increased by 1.3% from
2004 to 2005, however it has fallen
by 1.8% since then. (IMF) Ordinary
Saudis have begun to question where
the wealth from oil is disappearing
to, especially because the cost per
barrel of oil is at an all-time high. To
many people, it is simple. The royal
family, which was already believed
to be corrupt, is keeping oil revenues
and, thereby, living extravagant
lifestyles. (Bradley, 220) To many
of the clerics and to much of the
general public, this is another reason
to believe that the ruling House of
Saud is not legitimate.
However, the royal family has
started to listen to many of the
forces that favor the westernization
of the country. In fact, in 2002,
the Saudi royal family proposed a
plan at the Beirut Summit (Arab
Summit Conference) that would
have required Arab countries to
recognize that Israel is a state and
has the right to exist, in exchange for
Israel agreeing to create a sovereign
Palestinian state and finding a just
solution to the Palestinian refugee
problems. (Gold, 198) However, the
proposal did not meet the approval
of all the delegates at the meeting
and was not brought up again.
Although the proposal did not
succeed, the fact that it was even
proposed serves to show that the
royal family was paying significant
attention to many of the more liberal
elements in their country.
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In March, 2007, the Saudi
government again brought up the
peace plan proposal and wants to
present it again at a conference
in Riyadh. The fact that the Saudi
government wants to present a
plan that was soundly defeated just
5 years ago shows the influence
of these more liberal elements in
their country. The only Middle
Eastern countries that currently
have formal relations with Israel are
Egypt and Jordan; these relations
were mediated at the Camp David
Accords by President Carter. Saudi
Arabia would have been the third
Middle Eastern country to do so
and if it had done so, that would
have shaken up the Middle East as
we know it, because Saudi Arabia
is one of the most important actors
in that region.
Was the Saudi royal family
simply acting to please the more
liberal elements of its society or
were there other factors involved
in the proposed peace initiative
with Israel? One of the key factors
that one would have to consider is
the United States. It has long been
acknowledged that the United States
and Saudi Arabia have shared a
close relationship, especially with
the current heads of state, President
Bush and King Abdullah. The Saudi
royal family has given more than
$1 billion to companies in which
the Bush family has had significant
stake, such as the Carlyle Group
and Harken Energy, especially
when these companies struggled
financially. (Unger, 15) Furthermore,
former President George H. W. Bush
has long had significant personal
ties with Prince Bandar, who, until
recently, was the Saudi Ambassador
to the United States. Prince Bandar
reportedly commented to King Fadh
that he wanted to resign after former
President George H. W. Bush lost the
1992 election to President Clinton;
in fact, Prince Bandar stated, “It
was like I lost one of my family,
dead.” (Unger, 152) With all of
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these financial and personal ties
between the Bush family and the
Al-Saud family, it is surely possible
to think that this plays a role in
determining the policy between these
two countries. After all, humans are
not immune to affective bias while
making their decisions.
After the 9/11 attacks, the
United States government started to
push the royal family to do more in
the Middle East, where the United
States would not have been as
welcome. For instance, Saudi Arabia
was one of only three countries
that recognized the Taliban as the
official government of Afghanistan
after the Taliban takeover of Kabul
in 1996. However, after the 9/11
attacks, the Saudi royal family was
quick to support the efforts of the
US military in Afghanistan and
withdrew diplomatic recognition to
the Taliban just before the War in
Afghanistan began. (Lippman, 342)
Furthermore, Saudi Arabia allowed
the US to use Prince Sultan Air Base
to coordinate the air war against
Afghanistan, and they provided the
US Air Force with low cost oil, gas,
and fuel worth tens of millions of
dollars. (Prados and Blanchard, 9)
This was a monumental decision
by the Saudi royal family, because
they still faced a backlash due to
their decision to allow US troops to
be stationed there during the Gulf
War.
Furthermore, a vast majority of
Saudis did not approve of allowing
a Western country to use Saudi
air bases to strike another Muslim
nation. One of the reasons that
Saudi Arabia may have let the US
use Prince Sultan Air Base is that the
royal family was eager to appear as
a friend in the eyes of the American
public. At that time, the American
public was extremely skeptical of
the relationship between the US and
Saudi Arabia, especially because 15
of the 19 9/11 hijackers were Saudi
citizens. (Lippman, 325) Although
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the royal family knew that there
would again be considerable internal
backlash, they felt that they had to
maintain their relationship with the
United States and simply offering
their condolences to United States
would not have been sufficient.
However, there were some issues
on which the Saudi government
remained firm. Saudi Arabia has
long been accused by groups such
as Amnesty International of violating
human rights. These groups cite
instances such as public beheadings,
amputations, and alleged torture in
Saudi Arabia. Public punishment
(including beheadings) is commonly
used in Saudi Arabia in order to
deter crime. (Bradley, 137) However,
beheadings are not announced in
advance and even the convicted
have no prior knowledge of when
they will be executed. (Bradley,
135) Many human rights groups
have tried to get the royal family
to adopt a resolution that would
outlaw these practices, but have
been unsuccessful. The royal
family, however, claims that these
beheadings are the best way to deal
with crime in society. According to
Saudi law, a victim’s family is the
only group that can pardon a crime
after a person has been convicted.
The royal family maintains that this
means no one is above the law and
even cites as evidence that a son
of the influential Minister of the
Interior, Prince Naif, was almost
executed but was pardoned at the
last second by the victim’s family.
(Bradley, 137) However, many
human rights groups have said this
was a mere ploy staged by the royal
family to convince the world that
it treated everyone equally. Human
rights groups claim that the victim’s
family would have had serious
problems later if they had let the
execution take place as planned,
and cite this as evidence that the
royal family has a double standard:
one for the commoners and one for

themselves. (Bradley, 138)
There are other issues on which
Saudi Arabia has been reluctant to
change its stance. The United States
has asked that Saudi Arabia cut off
funding to many of the madrassas
(religious schools) that operate in
Saudi Arabia. However, this is an
impossible request. Saudi Arabia is
an Islamic state, first and foremost.
It would not be able to shut down
these schools; most Muslims agree
that such an action would be unIslamic. Not only do madrassas
teach Islam, they also take in many
orphans and those with no place to
live. Closing these schools would not
only be un-Islamic, it would seem
to be a move against the general
welfare of the country as well.
One of the main goals for any
Saudi monarch is to make sure that
Muslims can easily come and pray at
the holy sites of Mecca and Medina,
and that these sites are protected.
Almost every Saudi king has issued a
decree that cements the role of Islam
in society, has worked to improve
the conditions of the mosques in the
country, or has attempted to ensure
that pilgrims can safely perform
the hajj, one of the five pillars of
Islam. (Lippman, 317) These acts
are the ones that lend the notion
of religious legitimacy to the royal
family of Saudi Arabia. Without
them, the royal family would be in
a political quagmire. Closing down
these schools would be equivalent
to an American president enacting
a law that explicitly violated the
Constitution. The king would face
massive repercussions from the
clergy and general population, as
well as within the royal family
itself.
Although traditionally stable,
the House of Saud does have its
own internal conflicts. In 1975, King
Faisal was murdered by a nephew
because the nephew believed that
King Faisal was partly responsible
for his brother’s death. (Bradley,
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68) Different factions ally with each
other in order to consolidate more
power within themselves and one
day have a chance at the throne
and the massive oil wealth that
comes with the kingship. This adds
another degree of uncertainty about
the kingdom, because the reigning
monarch has to ensure that the
other members of the royal family
are placated. Fellow princes often
take opposing stands on an issue
and need to be cajoled so that a
compromise can be reached. In many
cases, people suspect that this may
mean diverting some of the revenue
from oil to these princes; this extra
revenue may satisfy the princes,
but it cuts off much need revenue
to other important sectors such
as education and healthcare. The
current monarch, King Abdullah, is
over 80 years old and, although he
has designated a Crown Prince, many
princes are still competing with each
other to move up the hierarchy and
thereby closer to kingship.
The House of Saud has to make
sure that it is religiously legitimate
or it will lose the support of the
clergy and, thereby, the general
population. However, it must also
try to work with other states and
groups who believe that the country
is behind times and needs to become
Westernized in order to maintain a
good public image. Compounding
all this, the royal family has to
remain united so that they can
maintain the notion that they are
the right people for the job. With
all these commitments, the House
of Saud is faced with a challenging
situation, having to work to meet
the needs of its citizens, pilgrims,
other countries, fellow princes, and
any other individuals or groups with
which it interacts, just to ensure that
it remains in power. In the future, the
country may have to risk alienating
one or more groups to meet the
demands of another. This alienation
could lead ultimately to toppling

the regime, if one actor feels as if it
has been unfairly disregarded. These
circumstances have led to an unstable
political regime that is doing whatever
it takes to remain in power.
The future holds many challenges
for the royal family. During her recent
visit to Saudi Arabia, the Speaker of
the House of Representatives, Nancy
Pelosi, commented that she would
like to see more women involved in
Saudi politics, although she refrained
from directly criticizing the royal
family. Furthermore, King Abdullah
commented that if the United States
suddenly withdrew from Iraq, Saudi
Arabia would have to support the
Sunni Arabs in Iraq to ensure that
they would not be in jeopardy.
Although Saudi Arabia has a Sunni
majority, there is still a sizable Shiite
minority, which composes 10-15% of
the population located primarily in
the oil producing Eastern region. The
Shiite minority, may feel threatened
by these possibilities and possibly
retaliate against the government.
The royal family will most likely face
serious concerns from its citizens
and interest groups, as well as other
countries over its policies. With all
these tumultuous events, only the
future will tell whether the royal
family will still be in the same state
as it currently is.
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